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We compile biographical information on more than 5,000 Prussian
politicians and exploit newly digitized administrative data to examine
whether landowning and landless elites differ in the extent to which
they support health infrastructure projects. Using exogenous variation
in soil texture, we present results from 2SLS regressions, suggesting
that the provision of health-promoting public goods improves with the
political influence of the landless elite. We also provide evidence for
two mechanisms: first, landless elites face a higher risk of strikes, and
second, they have more economic benefits from improving the health
of the poor. Finally, we illustrate that the relevance of these two
channels differs for those health-related public amenities that improve
the access to medical care and those that prevent the outbreak of
infectious diseases.
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1 Introduction
A growing number of empirical studies suggests that public infrastructure
investments are crucial for reducing infant mortality and improving public
health in developing and emerging countries (see Alsan and Goldin, 2019,
Beach et al., 2016, Cutler and Miller, 2005, Chapman, 2019, Duflo et al., 2015,
Gamper-Rabindran et al., 2010, Gallardo-Albarrán, 2020, Watson, 2006). An
urgent question is consequently why governments differ in the extent to
which they undertake investments in health infrastructure projects. Perhaps
surprisingly, the empirical political economy literature gives only relatively
few answers to this question (see e.g. Aidt et al., 2010, Franck and Rainer,
2012, Miller, 2008). In this paper, we study a historical case to fill this
research gap. More specifically, we distinguish between landowning and
landless elites and investigate how elite structure affects the provision of
health-promoting public goods in a non-democratic industrializing regime.1
Addressing our research question is difficult for a variety of reasons.
To meet these challenges, we consider late-19th/early-20th century Prussia.
Besides data availability, we believe that Prussia is an excellent case for
four reasons. First, Prussia was the leading country with regard to the
provision of health-promoting public goods at the beginning of the 20th
century (Brown, 1989). Second, local authorities were fully responsible for
the public investments in health infrastructure (Vögele, 2001). Third, the
Prussian electoral laws ensured that local policy decisions were made by
wealthy citizens (Dawson, 2019, Krabbe, 1989). Finally, the distribution of
local political power and the sanitary problems in Prussia were not much
different than in other Western countries that industrialized in the 19th
century or today’s emerging countries (Konteh, 2009).
The first major challenge when examining whether elites differ in their
support for public health infrastructure investments is to create an index,
reflecting how the political power was distributed between the landowning
and the landless elites. To address this issues, we proceed in three steps.
In the first step, we produce a list of all Prussian county directors, all
members of the Prussian House of Representatives, and all members of
1Our differentiation is consistent with various political economy models that distinguish
between two types of elites (see e.g. Galor et al., 2009, Llavador and Oxoby, 2005). The
term “landless” elite bundles together wealthy citizens that are not engaged in the
agricultural sector (i.e. firm owners, lawyers, professors, merchants, master craftsmen,
judges, teachers, etc.). We use the terms “landless” and “landowning” elite instead of
“urban” and “rural” elite since the place of living is a rather imprecise indicator for
people’s source of wealth in our case.
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the German parliament (Reichstag). In total, this list includes more than
5,000 Prussian politicians. In the second step, we hand-collect biographical
information on all these politicians and exploit this information to classify
them. According to our definition, a politician counts as a member of the
landowning elite if he owned agricultural estates or had close landowning
relatives. In the last step, we compute for each county in late-19th/early-
20th Prussia the share of posts that were occupied by the members of the
landowning elite.
The second key ingredient for analyzing how elite structure affected the
provision of health-promoting public goods in Prussia is a measure that
reflects how well-developed the public health infrastructure system was in
each county. The difficulty in this respect is that focusing on a single
health-promoting public good (e.g. public hospitals or sewage systems) is
inappropriate since a sophisticated health infrastructure system has various
pillars (Chapman, 2019). In addition, the reasons for why elites oppose or
support health infrastructure investments might vary for different types of
health-promoting public goods. Consequently, if we pay our attention to
only one specific type of health infrastructure, we are likely to get an in-
complete understanding of the mechanisms at work. To avoid this pitfall,
we use newly digitized administrative data to build a measure that takes
into account eight different health-promoting public goods.2 We also create
two sub-indices that differentiate between those public goods that mainly
improve the access to medical care and those that prevent the outbreak of
infectious diseases.3
We begin our empirical analysis with a cross-sectional OLS regression.
The results of this regression suggest a positive and statistically significant
correlation between the local political power of the landless elite and the
provision of health-promoting public goods. A series of robustness checks,
including a panel data analysis, confirms this positive association. We also
observe that the positive correlation holds if we distinguish between public
goods that decrease the risk of disease outbreaks and public goods that
provide access to medical treatment. To establish causality, we use a two-
stage least square approach that exploits natural variation in soil quality
2Our list of health-promoting public goods includes: hospitals, sewage systems, water
supply systems, waste collections, health funds, nursing facilities, baths, and slaughter
houses.
3In our robustness checks, we use infant mortality as an alternative measure. A key
advantage of this approach is that we can run panel regressions. The weak spot is
that improved health infrastructure is only one of various channel through which elite
structure affects infant mortality.
2
(for similar approaches, see e.g. Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016, Easterly, 2007,
Goni, 2018). Our second-stage estimates indicate that landless elites invest
more in health infrastructure than landowning elites. In particular, we see
that a one standard deviation increase in the political power of the land-
less elite improves the provision of health-promoting public goods by 0.3
standard deviations. Common first-stage diagnostics suggest that a weak-
instrument bias is relatively unlikely. We also provide evidence, suggesting
that our results are unlikely to be driven by a violation of the exclusion
restriction.
The theoretical political economy literature presents two key reasons for
why the elite of a non-democratic regime might support the provision of
human-capital promoting public goods. The first theory is that the elite
fears strikes and political turmoil and thus implements policies from which
the poor benefit (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2005, Aidt and Franck,
2015, 2019, Conley and Temimi, 2001). Consistent with this theory, we find
that the landless elites in Prussia invested more in health infrastructure
if the workers’ movements were well organized. We also observe that this
mechanism is especially relevant for those public goods that improve the
access to medical care. The second popular theory is that the elite has
economic benefits if the human capital of the poor increases (Bourguignon
and Verdier, 2000, Galor and Moav, 2006, Galor et al., 2009, Lizzeri and Persico,
2004). In line with this theory, we illustrate that the landless elites in
Prussia provided more health-promoting public goods if workspaces were
relatively crowded and infectious diseases thus spread quickly among the
workforce. This result is completely driven by those health infrastructure
projects that prevent outbreaks of diseases.
Our paper contributes to the growing political economy literature that
investigates why the provision of health-promoting public goods differs
between and within countries. Previous studies put their attention to the
consequences of franchise extensions (see Aidt et al., 2010, Fujiwara, 2015,
Miller, 2008), democratization (see Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006, Kudamatsu,
2012), political selection (see Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014, Franck and
Rainer, 2012), and government ideology (see Potrafke, 2010, Potrafke and
Roesel, 2020). Our focus is different since we examine how power shifts
within the wealthy elite of a non-democratic regime affect the provision of
health-promoting public goods. Addressing this pending issue is of great
relevance because local decisions on infrastructure projects often crucially
depend on the policy preferences of the wealthy elites in the developing
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world. Furthermore, our study improves the understanding of why public
investment in health infrastructure greatly increased in many Western
countries during the late-19th/early-20th century.
We also contribute to the literature in development economics that
examines how elites, and especially large landowners, affect the provision of
human-capital promoting public goods and thus long-run economic growth
(see Andersson and Berger, 2019, Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016, Cvrcek and
Zajicek, 2019, Galor and Moav, 2006, Galor et al., 2009, Goni, 2018, Nafziger,
2011, Ramcharan, 2010, Vollrath, 2013). Our analysis differs from other
analyses because we study the provision of health-promoting public goods
rather than the provision of education facilities. This difference is notable
since the mechanisms at work are unlikely to be the same for all human-
capital promoting public goods. Galor et al. (2009) argue that landed and
landless elites have different preferences for public spending on education
because the productivity-enhancing effects of improved education are much
lower in the agricultural sector than in the other sectors. We think that
this logic can hardly be applied to health-promoting public goods since
physical fitness is of high importance in the agricultural sector (see e.g.
Behrman et al., 1997, Fink and Masiye, 2015, Strauss, 1986). Consistent with
this doubt, we provide evidence for two other arguments that explain why
a landless elite invests more in the public health infrastructure than a
landowning elite.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature that investigates which
political economy factors cause policy reforms in the course of economic
development. This literature includes two basic theories. The first theory
suggests that a conflict of interests exists between an elite and a poorer
class and predicts that the public expenditures for education and health
increase in the political power of the poorer class (see e.g. Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2000, 2005). The alternative theory implies that changes in the
preferences of the elite are the key reason for changes in the provision of
human-capital promoting public goods (see e.g. Galor and Moav, 2006, Galor
et al., 2009). We provide evidence for both theories and suggest that it
depends on the characteristics of a public good whether the first or the
second theory applies.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we inform about
our institutional environment. Section 3 describes how we create our key




We consider late-19th/early-20th century Prussia to investigate whether the
provision of health-promoting public goods in a non-democratic country
depends on the structure of the wealthy elite. In what follows, we briefly
describe why Prussia provides an institutional setting that is particularly
well-suited for addressing our research question. In Appendix A, we offer
additional information, especially on the administrative structure and the
voting systems that were applied at the different layers of government.
Provision of health-promoting public goods
As in most other western countries, the demand for health infrastructure
investments grew notably in Prussia during the 19th-century due to the
Industrial Revolution. Meeting this challenge was primarily a responsibility
of the local authorities because the municipal councils in Prussia decided
alone in which infrastructure projects they invest in and also on how to
finance these investments (see Dawson, 2019, Krabbe, 1985, Vögele, 2001). A
consequence of this great fiscal autonomy was substantial variation in the
provision of health-promoting public goods.
In the late-19th/early-20th century, Prussian municipalities already had a
variety of health-related amenities. The most common amenities were water
supply and sewage systems, hospitals, public baths, and slaughter houses
(Krabbe, 1985). Especially remarkable in this respect is that most of these
amenities were municipalized (Dawson, 2019).4 For example, in the beginning
of the 20th century, 94 percent of the water companies were in municipal
ownership (Krabbe, 1985). For hospitals, this share was somewhat smaller
because of the non-negligible number of church-owned hospitals (Guttstadt,
1900). However, many counties and municipalities subsidized these church-
owned hospitals (Vögele, 2001). Vögele (2001) also suggests that both the
municipal- and the church-owned hospitals were primarily visited by poor
people.
At the turn of the 20th century, Prussia was a leading country with
regard to the provision of health-promoting public goods (Dawson, 2019).
This pioneer role is especially notable because the per-capita income in
Prussia was much lower than in England or the United States (Brown,
4A higher degree of communalization also existed in England, Italy, and Switzerland.
According to Dawson (2019), Prussia used the principle of municipalization to economic
undertakings more extensively than any other country.
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1989). Prussia reached this leading position due to massive infrastructure
investments in the late 19th century. For instance, the number of hospitals
in Prussia increased from 1626 in 1876 to 3892 in 1900 (Guttstadt, 1900).
Similarly, Grahn (1898) and Salomon (1907) report large increases in the
number of water supply and sewage systems. A consequence of all these
health infrastructure investments was a declining mortality rate (see Brown,
1989, Gallardo-Albarrán, 2020, Gehrmann, 2011).5
Political system
Prussia was a semi-constitutional monarchy where the right to vote was
restricted to men and where the electoral laws ensured that virtually all
policy decisions were made by the wealthy rather than the poor people
(Dawson, 2019, Hofmann, 1964, Krabbe, 1989). At the local level, the poor
had hardly any political influence for two main reason. The first is the
suffrage which had only been granted to a citizen if he owned a dwelling
house, paid a sufficient amount of income tax, or carried out a business.
Furthermore, citizens lost their right to vote if they received any kind of
pauper relief, went bankrupt, or delayed their tax payments (Dawson, 2019).
The consequence of these rules was that only relatively few people were
eligible to vote or to become a member of a local council. For example,
Krabbe (1985) reports that only 2,743 of the more than 45,000 inhabitants
of the city of Dortmund had the right to participate in the municipal
election in 1873.
The second main reason for why municipal councils were dominated
by wealthy citizens is the voting system, known as Three-Class Franchise
System. A key feature of this voting system is that it translates tax
payments into voting power (Becker and Hornung, 2020, Dawson, 2019, Kühne,
1994a, Krabbe, 1989). More specifically, prior to the election, the eligible
voters were first ranked based on their tax amounts and then divided into
three groups such that the sum of all tax payments did not vary across
these three groups. Typically, the first group only included a few voters,
whereas the bulk of the electorate belonged to the third group (Hofmann,
1964). In various cases, the first group only consisted of one voter. For
instance, in the city of Essen, the famous steel manufacturer and inventor
5Improved health infrastructure is not the only reason for why mortality declined in
late-19th/early-20th century Prussia. Other important reasons are the introduction of
Bismarck’s health insurance (Bauernschuster et al., 2020) and medical innovations such as
the discovery of the diphtheria antitoxin (Vögele, 2001).
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Alfred Krupp was the only first-class voter from 1886 to 1894 (Krabbe,
1989). The unequal group sizes are remarkable because each of the three
groups selected one third of the municipal councilors. Put differently, the
few voters in the first group were as influential as all the voters in the
third group. In the city of Essen, Alfred Krupp thus chose the same
number of councilors in 1891 as the 393 voters in the second group and
the 3650 voters in the third group (Krabbe, 1989). A consequence of this
unequal distribution of influence was that the representatives of the poor
hardly became members of the local councils. For example, in the cities of
Dortmund and Münster, the working class was not represented in the city
councils until the 1890s. Between 1900 and 1914, the share of councilors
that belonged to the working class was smaller than 10 percent in both
cities (Krabbe, 1985).
The electoral laws privileged the wealthy elite not only at the municipal
level but also at other levels of government. For example, a variant of the
Three-Class Franchise System was applied to decide on the members of the
Prussian House of Representatives (Becker and Hornung, 2020, Kühne, 1994a).
Furthermore, most influential political posts, such as county administrator
(Landrat), mayor (Bürgermeister), or community leader (Gemeindevorsteher),
required approval from the Prussian government (Wagner, 2005). Since the
Prussian government aimed to keep the working class out of the political
system, a representative of the poor could hardly occupy a leading post
even if he would be nominated by the responsible council. In addition to
the electoral laws, the Prussian government used various other measures to
reduce the political influence of the working class. For instance, between
1878 and 1890, a series of laws, known as Socialist Laws, outlawed all
activities and newspapers that spread social-democratic principles (Lidtke,
1966). In Appendix A.2, we provide a more comprehensive description of
the voting procedures that were used at the different layers of government
and explain in greater detail why they favored the wealthy people of the
Prussian society.
3 Main variables
3.1 The distribution of political power
The conventional procedure for measuring how much political influence a
specific social group has is to compute the share of political posts being
7
occupied by the members of this group (see e.g. Clots-Figueras, 2011, 2012,
Hyytinen et al., 2018).6 The ideal measure for the local political power of






(1 − pj) ∈ [0, 1] (1)
where n > 0 denotes the number of local politicians and pj a dummy
variable that is equal to 0 (1) if a politician j ∈ {1, . . . , n} belongs to
the landless (landowning) elite. The political influence of the landowning
elite is then:
A = 1 − U ∈ [0, 1]. (2)
In practice, computing A and U is difficult for various reasons. A key
problem is that creating a list of all municipal councilors is impossible
because of limited data availability. As an alternative, we exploit data on
politicians that represented the municipalities in superordinate bodies. To
this end, we first check for which types of political posts a full list of
incumbents exist. Extensive searches in dictionaries yield that this is the
case for (i) the county directors,7 (ii) the members of the Prussian House
of Representatives, and (iii) the members of the parliament of the German
Empire (Reichstag).8 In total, our three lists include 5,144 politicians (for
details, see Table D.2). All of them were male and served between 1867
and 1914.
The main conceptual challenge when building measures for the political
power of the landowning and landless elite in Prussia is to establish the
criteria based on which we can classify the politicians. Our guide in this
regard is the literature on political selection (for reviews, see Besley, 2005,
6Clots-Figueras (2011, 2012) uses the share of female parliamentarians to measure the
political power of women. Hyytinen et al. (2018) measure the influence of the public
employees with the share of local parliamentarians that work in the public sector.
Implicitly, the assumption that the political power of a social group increases in the
number of parliamentary seats is also made by all studies that apply a Regression
Discontinuity Design to test whether political selection affects policy outcomes (see e.g.
Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008).
7The Prussian administrative system distinguished between counties (Landkreise) and
county boroughs (Stadtkreise). The former were governed by a county administrator
(Landrat), whereas the Lord Mayor of the eponymous town served as the head of a
county borough. We use the term “county director” to simultaneously refer to both of
these posts.
8Best and Schröder (1992) list the members of the Reichstag. Kühne (1994b) and Mann
(1988) itemize the members of the Prussian House of Representatives. To identify the
heads of the counties and county boroughs, we use various handbooks (Gey, 1976,
Hauf, 1980, Hubatsch et al., 1975, Klein, 1988, Romeyk, 1994, Stüttgen, 1980, Wagner, 1982,
Wegmann, 1969), Wikipedia, and the online database of Jehnke (2013).
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Table 1 Documentation of the data collection process (excerpt).




Becker, Hermann 0 Mann (1988), Romeyk
(1994)
He was a merchant before he became a
politician. Father was a physician,
father-in-law was a merchant.
Becker, Leo 1 Best and Schröder (1992) Owner of a manor.
Becker, Wilhelm
(von)
1 Romeyk (1994) Father was a pastor. Father-in-law was a
business man and owned a manor.
Received noble title in 1911.
Beckerath, Gustav
Adolf von





Notes: This table illustrates based on four examples how we document our data collection process. The final
documentation file consists of more than 300 pages and is available upon request.
and Dal Bó and Finan, 2018). In particular, we will take over the idea of
using personal characteristics as the basis of classification. A politician will
thus be labeled as a member of the landed elite (pj = 1) if he owned
arable land or belonged to a family that owned land (for more details, see
Appendix B).
Determining whether a particular Prussian politician owned land or had
landowning relatives is difficult since no centralized source of information
exists. Put differently, we have to run a separate information search for
each of the 5,144 politicians in our database. More specifically, we first
verify whether a politician has an entry in (i) Wikipedia, (ii) the online
databases on important persons published by the states of Hesse, North
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Saxony, or (iii) the
biographical handbooks published by Angerbauer (1996), Best and Schröder
(1992), Dvorak (1996, 1999a,b, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2013, 2014), Gey (1976), Hansen
and Tennstedt (2010), Hauf (1980), Haunfelder (1994), Herlemann and Schatz
(1996), Klein (1988), Kühne (1994b), Mann (1988), Romeyk (1994), Wagner
(1982), and Wegmann (1969). For the members of a noble family, we also
browsed through various issues of the Gothaisches Genealogisches Taschen-
buch.9 If none of our primary sources provided helpful information, we
carried out a comprehensive online search. At the end of our search, we
use the available information to classify the politician (for example cases,
see Appendix B.2). For the sake of transparency, we develop a document
9The Gothaisches Genealogisches Taschenbuch is regularly updated encyclopedia that
includes detailed information about noble families.
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[0,.111] Other German States
Notes: This figure presents a map of the German Empire in the borders of 1890. The shade of green
indicates how powerful the landless elite was between 1890 and 1910. A dark (light) shed of green
suggests that the landless (landowning) elite enjoyed great political influence.
that lists our references and provides short explanations for all decisions.
Table 1 presents an excerpt of this document.
For 4 out of 2657 members of the Prussian House of Representatives
(0.1%) and 144 out of 2031 county directors (7.1%), we do not find
any usable biographical information. In our main analysis, we label them
as representatives of the landowning elite. We proceed in this way since
we expect that the provision of health-promoting public goods improves if
the political influence of the landowning elite decreases. Confirming this
hypothesis is most challenging if we classify all politicians for which no
biographical information exist as members of the landowning elite.
To finally obtain a county-level measure for the local political power of
the landless elite, we use an aggregation procedure that consists of four
steps.10 In the first step, we compute the fraction of time in which the
director of a county (i) was a representative of the landless elite:
UAdmini,t =
1




(1 − pAdmini,k ) (3)
where τ1 (τ2) denotes the start (end) year of period t and p
Admin ∈ {0, 1}
10For an example, see Table D.4.
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whether the county director owned land or had a landowning relative. In
the second and third step, we produce equivalent sub-indicators for the


























(1 − pMPReichi,j,k )
 (5)
where λ (σ) denotes the number of politicians that represent the county
in the Prussian (German) parliament and pMPP (pMPR) ∈ {0, 1} whether
a particular politician belonged to the landed elite.11 In the last step, we
aggregate our three sub-indicators, using an additive aggregation rule.12 Our











i,t ) and Ai,t = 1 − Ui,t. (6)
Figure 1 shows for each Prussian county how powerful the landless elite
was in the late-19th/early-20th century. We see great heterogeneity both
across and within the Prussian provinces. In particular, our data suggests
that the landless elite was least influential in the provinces of East Prussia
and Pomerania and most powerful in the provinces of Westphalia, Hesse-
Nassau, and Rhineland. This result fits well together with the assessments
of many historians (see e.g. Gerschenkron, 1943, Kühne, 1994a, Wagner, 2005,
Wehler, 1987).
3.2 The provision of health-promoting public goods
We use historical records published by the Prussian Statistical Office (see
Tetzlaff, 1911, 1914) to create a county-level measure for the provision of
health-promoting public goods. A feature of this data source is that it
11Note that some electoral districts included more than one county. The parliamentarians
that represented these electoral districts thus play a role for multiple counties.
12We use an additive aggregation rule in our basic version because we believe that our
three sub-indices constitute partial substitutes. In Section 4.4, we will show that our
empirical results do not significantly change when we apply an alternative aggregation
method. For an overview about the strengths and weaknesses of specific aggregation
techniques, see Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2019).
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Table 2 List of health-related public amenities in our data set.
Public good Main purpose
Hospitals Provide access to medical care.
Nursing facilities Provide access to medical care.
Public health funds Provide access to medical care.
Sewage systems Prevent outbreak of diseases.
Water supply systems Prevent outbreak of diseases.
Waste collection Prevent outbreak of diseases.
Public baths Prevent outbreak of diseases.
Slaughter houses Prevent outbreak of diseases.
provides information on eight different health-related public amenities (see
Table 2). This detailedness is remarkable because we can thus take into
account that the literature suggests various public goods that improve
people’s health.13 In addition, our public goods differ in the way of how
their provision affects health. While three of them ease the access to
medical care, the others prevent the outbreaks of diseases. In Section 4.3,
we exploit this feature of our data set to test whether the actions of the
elite depend on the type of the health-promoting public good. In theory,
one might expect such a dependency. For example, if elites fear that an
infectious disease triggers a shortage of workers and thus reduces their
returns on investment, they should mainly provide those public goods that
decrease the risk of a disease outbreak.14
In Table D.3, we present two examples to show how we measure the
provision of health-promoting public goods at the county-level. For each
county, we first compute the total number of municipalities, using the data
set by Galloway (2007).15 We then extract from Tetlaff’s reports how many
municipalities provided a particular health-promoting public good in 1911









13For related studies, see Alsan and Goldin (2019), Beach et al. (2016), Buchmueller et al.
(2006), Gallardo-Albarrán (2020), Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal (2017), Kremer et al. (2011),
and Watson (2006).
14If elites have the aforementioned fear, improving the access to medical care is only a
second-best solution because this cannot prevent that there will be sick leaves if an
infectious disease breaks out.
15As explained in Appendix A, there were three different types of municipalities: towns,
rural communities, and estates. Galloway (2007) reports county-level figures on the total
number of municipalities only for every fifth year. For creating our measure, we thus
use the figures of 1910.
12





[0,.015504] Other German States
Notes: This figure presents a map of the German Empire in the borders of 1911. The shade of green
reflects the extent of public good provision. The darker the shade of green, the more health-promoting
public goods were provided.
where e is the total number of municipalities and D a dummy that is
equal to 1 if a municipality provided the health-promoting public good in
1911, and 0 otherwise. Our main measure of public good provision is the








To investigate the provision of different types of health-promoting public
goods, we separately compute means for the public goods that ease the
access to medical care and those that prevent the outbreak of infectious
diseases.
Figure 2 shows the extent to which health-promoting public goods were
provided in 1911. We observe notable differences, especially between the
eastern and western provinces and between the counties and the county
boroughs. We also find that the level of public good provision was least





We begin our empirical analysis with a cross-sectional model in which the
provision of health-related public amenities (H) is a function of the political
power of the landless elite (U) and a set of other variables (X):
Hi = ζ + β · Ui + γ ·Xi + εi. (9)
Our parameter of key interest is β, showing how the provision of health-
promoting public goods changes if the political power of the landless elite
increases. Put differently, a positive estimate of β suggests that landless
elites invest more in health infrastructure than landowning elites.
To establish causality, we present results from a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) approach that exploits natural variation in soil texture to create
exogenous variation in the local political power of the landless elite (for
similar approaches, see Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016, Goni, 2018). Our first-
stage regression model is thus:
Ui = κ + α · Si + δ ·Xi + ηi. (10)
where S ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of loamy soils (i.e. low quality soil).
According to Cinnirella and Hornung (2016), this measure of soil texture is
ideal for serving as instrumental variable since it cannot be changed by
humans.
We expect the first-stage parameter (α) to be negative and statistically
significant due to the following logic. The profitability of small farms and
consequently the demand for land increases in the quality of the soil. The
wealthy landowners in late-19th/early-20th century Prussia therefore faced
less competition and had higher revenues if the soil quality was low. Due
to the Prussian political system (for details, see Section 2), they also had
more political influence in this case. Consistent with our expectation, we
find a strong negative correlation between the share of loamy soils and the
political power of the landless elite (see Figure 3).
Our 2SLS approach produces unbiased estimates of β if our instrumental
variable satisfies two conditions. The first condition requires that the share
of loamy soils and the political power of the landless elite are strongly
correlated. In our empirical analysis, we will report the results of the
14
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first-stage diagnostics proposed by Anderson and Rubin (1949) and Sanderson
and Windmeijer (2016) to show that this first condition holds. The second
condition is that the share of loamy soils affects the provision of health-
promoting public goods only through its effect on the distribution of the
local political power. We are aware that this crucial condition might be
violated. For example, soil quality might affect crop choices, which in turn
influences cultural traits and thus policy preferences (Ang, 2019, Luttmer
and Singhal, 2011). Soil quality might also affect the demand for health-
promoting public goods by influencing eating habits. To block these and
other alternative channels, we will add a large number of control variables
to our regression model.
The number of Prussian counties and county boroughs increased notably
between 1871 and 1914. For us, these increases create a small challenge
since we have a measure of soil quality that matches the administrative
borders of 1871 (see Meitzen, 1869, 1894) and information on the provision
of health-promoting public good provision for 1911 (see Tetzlaff, 1914). To
address this problem, we aggregate the latter to the borders of 1871 (for
similar approaches, see e.g. Cinnirella and Streb, 2017, Lehmann-Hasemeyer and
Streb, 2018).16
16In 1871, Prussia consisted of 20 county boroughs and 402 counties. Our baseline sample
will only consist of 17 county boroughs and 361 counties. Two reasons explain this
reduction. First, Meitzen’s data on the share of loamy soils does not exist for the
district of Wiesbaden (Hesse-Nassau) and the province of Hohenzollern. Second, the




Table 3 reports the results of six regressions. These regressions share three
common features: First, they all exploit a sample that includes 17 county
boroughs and 361 counties. Second, all non-binary variables are standardized
such that they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (for
summary statistics, see Table D.5). Third, public good provision is always
measured with a coverage rate that takes into account the availability of
eight health-promoting public goods in 1911 (for a list, see Table 2).
Column 1 presents the OLS estimate of a regression model that consists
of only two explanatory variables: a dummy variable that is equal to one
for all county boroughs17 and a measure that reflects how powerful the
landless elite was between 1871 and 1911.18 Our OLS estimate suggests a
positive relationship between the political power of the landless elite and
the provision of health-promoting public goods. In particular, we observe
that a one standard deviation increase in the power of the landless elite
is associated with a 0.16 standard deviations increase in the provision of
health-promoting public goods.
The OLS estimate reported in Column 1 might be biased because of
measurement error in our variable of interest, unobserved confounders, and
reverse causality. In Column 2, we thus show the results from our 2SLS
approach. We find that our 2SLS estimate (β̂2SLS = 0.25) slightly exceeds
our OLS estimate (β̂OLS = 0.16).
19 Our first-stage diagnostics suggest that
our second-stage estimate does not suffer from a weak-instrument bias (for
the first-stage and the reduced-form estimate, see Table D.6).
In Column 3 and 4, we add a full set of district fixed effects to our
regression model. These fixed effects control for all political, historical,
demographical, cultural, geographical, and economical factors that vary at
the district level. Given that the regional differences in late-19th/early-20th
century Prussia were often substantial, we think that this model extension
constitutes a demanding test for our baseline findings.20 We observe that
17Our regression results indicate that county boroughs provide significantly more public
good provision than counties. We do not present these results to save space. When
excluding the county-borough-dummy from our regression model, the estimates of our
variable of interest become larger and statistically more significant.
18We think that 1871 is a good starting point since the German Empire was founded
in this year. 1911 is the year for which we have data on public good provision. In
Section 4.4, we show that our results do not significantly change if we replace 1871
with another year.
19The difference that we observe between our OLS and 2SLS estimates are similar as in
related studies (see e.g. Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016, Easterly, 2007, Ramcharan, 2010).
20Including district fixed effects is especially demanding for our 2SLS approach because
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Table 3 Political power of landless elite and the provision of health-promoting public
goods (OLS and 2SLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Power landless elite 0.161*** 0.248*** 0.094*** 0.322** 0.082*** 0.336***
(0.0189) (0.0541) (0.0247) (0.1400) (0.0237) (0.1228)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 30.48 - 8.67 - 10.08
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.000 - 0.014 - 0.004
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is a coverage rate that takes into
account eight health-promoting public goods (for details, see Section 3.2). All variables are standardized to
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table
D.5. We present robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point
estimates that are significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
our OLS estimate remains positive and statistically significant when adding
district fixed effects. However, the magnitude of our OLS estimate decreases
from 0.16 to 0.10. Our 2SLS estimate, by contrast, increases slightly, and
thus further substantiates the view that the provision of health-promoting
public goods improves if the political power shifts from the landless to the
landowning elite.
Ideally, we would like to add a lagged value of our measure of public
good provision to our regression model in order to further address the
concern that our results are driven by an unobserved historical or cultural
factor. Unfortunately, this is not possible due to limited data availability.
As an alternative, we expand our regression model by five variables that
characterize the level of health and public health care in the early 1870s.
These variables are the crude death rate, the death rate of newborns,
the number of people working in the health sector (per capita), the total
number of beds in public hospitals (per capita), and the total number of
beds in public maternity hospitals (per capita). Compared with Columns
3 and 4, we find that neither our OLS estimate nor our 2SLS estimate
changes in a notable manner due to this model extension (see Columns 5
and 6). Especially for our second-stage estimate, this robustness is quite
remarkable since our control variables block many other channels through
which soil texture might affect the provision of health-promoting amenities.
For example, if soil texture affects dietary habits and thus, due to their
effect on health, the demand for health-promoting public goods, we should
they absorb a substantial share of the natural variation in soil quality. This also
explains why strength of our instrumental variables decreases slightly.
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Table 4 Different types of health-promoting public goods (OLS and 2SLS).
Access to medical care Prevention of outbreaks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power landless elite 0.069** 0.302* 0.087*** 0.343***
(0.0352) (0.1585) (0.0217) (0.1243)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 10.08 - 10.08
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.048 - 0.052
Observations 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a coverage
rate that takes into account three health-promoting public goods that improve the access to medical care. In
Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is a coverage rate that takes into account five health-promoting
public goods that prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases. All variables are standardized to have a mean of
0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We present
robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that are
significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
observe that our 2SLS estimate reacts when controlling for the crude death
rate in 1871.
A feature of our data is that it includes information on various health-
promoting public goods. These public goods differ in the way of how
they affect health: while three of them improve the access to medical
care, the others prevent the outbreaks of infectious diseases. In Table 3,
we neglect this difference and use a measure that takes into account all
health-promoting public goods as the dependent variable. In Table 4, we
address this issue and differentiate between the two different types. Our
results suggest that the provision of both types improves in the political
power of the landless elite. However, the positive effect is statistically more
significant for those public goods that prevent the outbreak of infectious
diseases.
In sum, our regression results clearly suggest that landless elites provide
more health-promoting public goods than landowning elites. In Section 4.4,
we will present the results of several robustness checks to substantiate our
main finding. However, before we turn to these supplementary analyses, we
will shed light on the mechanisms at work.
4.3 Mechanisms
The theoretical political economy literature suggests two main reasons for
why an elite of a non-democratic regime might support the provision of
human-capital promoting public goods. The first reason is that an elite
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might thus reduce the risk of strikes and social turmoils. (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2001, 2005, Conley and Temimi, 2001). The second reason is that
an elite might enjoy income gains due to the complementarities between
physical and human capital (Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000, Galor and Moav,
2006). Below, we will illustrate that both mechanisms play a role in our
case. We will also show that their relevance differs for our two different
types of health-promoting public goods.
4.3.1 Risk of strikes
A key prediction of various political economy models is that elites of non-
democratic regimes fear strikes and other forms of social unrest, and thus
implement redistribution policies that improve the wealth of the poor (see
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2005, Aidt and Franck, 2015, 2019, Boix,
2003, Conley and Temimi, 2001). Consequently, a reason for why a landless
elite provides more health-promoting public goods than a landowning elite
might be that the workers in the non-agricultural sectors can organize a
large-scale protest more easily than the agricultural workers. For late-19th/
early-20th century Prussia, this explanation might play a role because
the workers’ movements that existed at that time were largely dominated
by non-agricultural workers (see Kocka, 1983, Kühne, 1994a). Furthermore,
the Prussian workers’ movements often demonstrated against poor health
conditions and improving the access to health care was one of the major
objectives of the Social Democratic Party (see Rosenberg, 1967, Tenfelde and
Volkmann, 1981, Tennstedt, 1983).21
To show that differences in the strength of workers’ movements can
indeed serve as an explanation for why the landless elites provide more
health-promoting public goods, we estimate the regression model:
Hi = ζ + β ·Bi + σ ·Wi + π · (Bi × Wi) + γ ·Xi + εi. (11)
where W denotes the strength of the workers’ movements. In line with
Bauernschuster et al. (2020), we use the vote share of the Social Democratic
Party (SPD) to proxy how well the workers were organized. In particular,
we set W equal to 0 (1) if the vote share of the SPD is below (above)
the 75 percent quantile.
21Among historians, it is widely acknowledged that Bismarck reformed the public health
insurance system in 1883 to win voters who were attracted by the policy proposal of
the Social Democratic Party (see e.g. Rosenberg, 1967).
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Table 5 Mechanism analysis: risk of strikes (OLS and 2SLS).
All public goods Access Prevention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Landless elite 0.042** 0.259*** 0.015 0.216 0.056*** 0.274***
(0.0206) (0.0999) (0.0316) (0.1389) (0.0194) (0.0864)
SPD -0.084 -0.439*** -0.140 -0.654*** -0.048 -0.301**
(0.0657) (0.1402) (0.0956) (0.2041) (0.0582) (0.1346)
Landless elite × SPD 0.096** 0.194** 0.136** 0.321*** 0.070 0.115*
(0.0467) (0.0788) (0.0617) (0.1051) (0.0443) (0.0697)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 8.88 - 8.88 - 8.88
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.006 - 0.067 - 0.007
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. All non-binary variables are standardized to have a mean
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We present
robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that are
significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present the OLS and 2SLS results from
estimating (11). As in our baseline regressions, we exploit a coverage
rate that takes into account eight health-promoting public goods as the
dependent variable (for details, see Section 3.2). We observe that an
increase in the political influence of the landless elite has a positive and
statistically significant effect on the provision of health-promoting public
goods, independently of whether workers’ movements are strong or weak
(β > 0). We also observe that this positive effect becomes larger if the
workers are well organized (π > 0). The latter finding is consistent with
the hypothesis that elites provide more public goods if they face a high
protest risk. The former result shows that differences in the strength of
the workers’ movements are not the only reason for why landowning and
landless elites differ in their decisions on the provision of health-promoting
public goods.
In Columns 3 – 6 of Table 5, we examine whether the role of the
workers’ movements differs for those health-promoting public goods that
improve access to medical care and those that prevent disease outbreaks.
Our results suggest that such a difference indeed exists. In particular, we
observe that the landless elite only improves the access to medical care
if workers’ movements are strong.22 By contrast, the provision of health-
22Besides the direct health effects, the related literature in history provides several
arguments for why workers benefited from public hospital and nursing facilities. For
example, Nieberding (2003) points out that the size of the sickness allowance varied
depending on whether a sick worker visited a hospital.
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promoting public goods that prevent outbreaks of diseases increases in the
political power of the landless elite, regardless of how well the workers’
movements are organized.
4.3.2 Personal benefits
The related literature suggests different reasons as to why the wealthy elite
might personally benefit if the health of the poor improves. A first is
that infectious diseases have spillover effects (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004). In
particular, if an infectious disease breaks out among the poor people, the
wealthy elite also faces an infection risk because the poor and the rich
people do not live fully separated from each other. The elite can thus
increase its own life expectancy when providing public goods that prevent
the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases.
To test whether differences in the fear of infection explain why landless
elites provide more health-promoting public goods than landed elites, we
require data that reflects how extensive the poor and the rich exchange
with each other. Unfortunately, such data does not exist for Prussia. To
substantiate that the landless elite was at least in part motivated by
the fear of infection, we therefore need to refer to the related qualitative
literature. For instance, Krabbe (1985) reports that the fear of infectious
diseases was the key reason for why the cities of Düsseldorf and Halle
established a modern water supply system (see also Vögele, 2001).
Brown (1988, 1989) suggests that landless elites support the provision of
health-promoting public goods since they economically benefit from these
public goods. In particular, landless elites were often engaged in industrial
branches in which people work together in relatively confined spaces. The
risk that infectious diseases spread quickly among their workers was thus
higher for the landless elites than for the landowning elite. Consequently,
the economic losses that the landless elites have if an infectious disease
breaks out are relatively high. To avoid these losses, the landless elites
promote the provision of public goods that prevent outbreaks of infectious
diseases. We test this hypothesis with the regression model:
Hi = ζ + β ·Bi + φ · Ci + λ · (Bi × Ci) + γ ·Xi + εi. (12)
where C is a proxy for how crowded the work spaces were in the non-
agricultural sector. More specifically, we use occupational data digitized by
Becker et al. (2014) to calculate the ratio between the number of employed
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Table 6 Mechanism analysis: personal benefits (OLS and 2SLS).
All public goods Access Prevention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Landless elite 0.072*** 0.239** 0.061* 0.226* 0.076*** 0.238**
(0.0242) (0.0934) (0.0365) (0.1229) (0.0218) (0.0964)
Workers per firm -0.040 -0.038 -0.071 -0.063 -0.021 -0.022
(0.0387) (0.0288) (0.0496) (0.0509) (0.0382) (0.0266)
Landless elite × Worker 0.084* 0.068* 0.081 0.060 0.083* 0.071*
per firm (0.0429) (0.0407) (0.0562) (0.0578) (0.0427) (0.0401)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 9.83 - 9.83 - 9.83
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.006 - 0.051 - 0.009
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. All non-binary variables are standardized to have a
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We
present robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates
that are significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
workers and the number of self-employed people in the mining and textile
industry. The basic idea is that the number of self-employed persons can
serve as a proxy for the number of firms and our ratio thus as a proxy
for the average number of workers per firm.
In Table 6, we show results from estimating (12). The structure of this
table is the same as in Table 5. Consistent with Brown’s hypothesis, we
find that the landless elite provides more health-promoting public goods if
the work spaces are narrow and infectious diseases thus likely to spread
quickly (see Columns 1 & 2). Columns 3 – 6 suggest that this result
is fully driven by those health-promoting public goods that prevent the
outbreak of infectious diseases. From a theoretical perspective, we believe
that this finding is plausible because improving the access to health care
mainly increases the chance of survival, while prevention measures reduce
the number of infected people and thus sick leaves.23
A question that might arise from Table 6 is how the landless elites
in late-19th/ early-20th century Prussia supported the provision of health-
promoting public goods. According to Krabbe (1985) and Vögele (2001), this
happens in different ways. First of all, the members of the landless elite
often served as local parliamentarians and used their posts to influence
23The literature suggests additional reasons for why the landless elites benefited from
health-promoting public goods that prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases. For
instance, Vögele (2001) argues that these public goods increased the rental incomes of
the landless elites. Because of limited data availability, we cannot empirically support
these arguments.
22
policy decisions. For instance, in the city of Dortmund, almost 60 percent
of all municipal councilors were merchants, bankers, or firm owners between
1870 and 1890 (Krabbe, 1985). Another way was that the landless elites
provided financial aid. For example, in the city of Essen, the local factory
owners financially supported the construction of the public water supply
system (Krabbe, 1985).
4.4 Additional results
In Section 4.2, we show results from OLS and 2SLS regressions, suggesting
that the provision of health-promoting public goods improves if the local
political power of the landless elite increases. In this section, we present
various robustness checks.
4.4.1 Additional control variables
We compile data on sixteen demographic characteristics that correlate with
both the distribution of the political power and the provision of public
goods. Among others, our list includes the illiteracy rate, the population
size (log), the number of Catholics (per capita), the urbanization rate, and
the number of married people (per capita). Figures C.1 and C.2 suggest
that our estimates do hardly change if we add our demographic controls
separately to our regression model. Columns 1 and 2 of Table D.7 show
that our findings also hold if we simultaneously control for all sixteen
variables. However, in the latter case, the first-stage relationship becomes
relatively week.
Some public finance studies suggest that administrative structures affect
public spending (see e.g. Blesse and Baskaran, 2016). A plausible concern
is thus whether unobserved administrative characteristics drive our results.
To illustrate that this is unlikely to be the case, we show in Columns
3 and 4 of Table D.7 that our OLS and 2SLS estimates remain positive
and statistically significant if we control for the number of towns, rural
communities, and estates in the county.
Another objection against our baseline regression model might be that
it does not control for economic differences within a district. Since data
on income levels are not available, we need to address this concern with
variables that describe the structure of the economy. In particular, we
calculate the share of people working in the agricultural, service, mining,
education, and transport sector and include these five shares as control
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variables to our regression model. Columns 5 and 6 of Table D.7 indicate
that our results are robust to this model extension.
4.4.2 Sub-sample analyses
We also perform sub-sample analyses to demonstrate the robustness of our
OLS and 2SLS estimates. First of all, we show in Column 1 of Table D.8
that our results do not change if we exclude all county boroughs from our
sample. In Column 2, we illustrate that our findings also hold if we drop
all counties without a town. Column 3 suggests that our estimates remain
unchanged if we exclude those provinces that were occupied by Prussia
during the 1860s. In Column 4, we restrict our sample to those counties
whose borders did not notably change between 1871 and 1911 and find
that our OLS and 2SLS estimates continue to be positive and statistically
significant.24 Furthermore, a series of jackknife analyses shows that our
results are not driven by a particular district or province (see Figures C.3
– C.6). Finally, if we use individual measures for the provision of health-
promoting public goods in urban and rural municipalities, we observe that
the distribution of political power between the landless and the landowning
elite affects public good provision only in rural municipalities (see Table
D.9). This finding is reassuring because wealthy landowners were hardly
members of the urban municipal councils and thus had only very little
influence on the policy decisions in urban communities in Prussia.
4.4.3 Measurement of political power
To create our basic measure for the local political power of the landless
elite, we use an additive aggregation procedure and took into account all
county directors, all members of the Prussian House of Representatives, as
well as all Prussian members of the Reichstag that were active between
1871 and 1911 (for details, see Section 3.1). A number of tests suggests
that our main results hold if we modify our measurement approach. First,
Table D.10 shows that our point estimates remain positive and statistically
significant if we use only one of the three posts. Columns 1 and 2 of
Table D.11 illustrate that our results also hold when using a multiplicative
aggregation procedure rather than an additive approach. Columns 3 and 4
indicate that our results do not significantly change if we use 1900 rather
24We define a change of the administrative borders as “notable” if a county was divided
into two or more counties, or if a town became a county borough.
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than 1871 as our starting point.25 Finally, in our baseline approach, we
treat all politicians for which we do not find any biographical information
as members of the landowning elite. Table D.12 shows that our estimates
hardly change if we exclude these politicians when computing our measure
for the distribution of power.
4.4.4 Measurement of public good provision
In our baseline analysis, we use a measure that takes into account eight
health-promoting public goods as our dependent variable. As a robustness
check, we perform jackknife analyses that consecutively exclude each health-
promoting public good. Figures C.7 and C.8 present the results of these
analyses. We find that our baseline results are not driven by a particular
public good.
Some related studies exploit data on infant mortality to measure the
provision of health-promoting public goods (see e.g. Franck and Rainer, 2012,
Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014). Compared to our approach, using infant
mortality rates has advantages and disadvantages. A key advantage is that
mortality data does not only reflect differences in the number of health-
promoting public goods but also differences in their quality. A disadvantage
is that infant mortality rates also depend on other factors. Without some
additional evidence, it thus remains unclear to what extent the effect of
a political factor on infant mortality can be explained by the provision of
health-promoting public goods.
We estimate the following regression model to examine how the political
power of the landless elite affects infant mortality:
∆M t1 − t2i = µ + δ · lnM
t1
i + β ·Bi + γ ·Xi + εi (13)
where M t1 denotes the infant mortality rate in period t1 (1875 – 1879) and
∆M t1 − t2 = ln M t1 − ln M t2 the relative change in the infant mortality rate
between periods t1 and t2 (1909 – 1913).
26 The estimate of our parameter
of interest (β) will be positive if the infant mortality rate decreases in the
political power of the landless elite.
Table D.13 presents our regression results when using data on infant
25We checked various starting points and observed that our regression results do not
depend on this choice. To save space, we only report the estimates for 1900. Results
for other starting points are available upon request.
26We define the infant mortality rate as the share of newborns that died within the first
year of life. Our data comes from Galloway (2007).
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mortality. As in our main analysis (see Table 3), we apply three different
regression models and report OLS and 2SLS estimates. Our findings show
that infant mortality decreases if political power shifts from the landowning
elite to the landless elite. Since various studies find that health-related
amenities play a crucial role in reducing (infant) mortality in developing
and industrializing countries (see Alsan and Goldin, 2019, Chapman, 2019,
Gallardo-Albarrán, 2020), we believe that the results reported in Table D.13
can at least partly be explained by the fact that the landless elites in
Prussia invested more intensively in public health infrastructure than the
landowning elites.
4.4.5 Land inequality
A key difference between our study and many related studies is that we
exploit biographical data rather than data on land inequality to measure
how the local political power was distributed between the landed and the
landless elite. A legitimate question in this regard is whether our novel
approach has notable advantages. From a conceptual perspective, we think
that our approach is superior because land inequality is only a (potential)
determinant of the influence of the landowning elite.27 Furthermore, land
inequality might affect public good provision through other channels than
the distribution of the political power.
To illustrate that our measurement approach also creates an empirical
added value, we proceed in four steps. First, we exploit data on the
distribution of land collected by the Prussian Statistical Office in 1882 and
digitized by Becker et al. (2014) to produce a measure of land inequality.28
Second, we run a bivariate OLS regression in which our measure of land
inequality is the explanatory variable. The R2 of this regression indicates
that land inequality explains only 3.17 percent of the variation in the
provision of health-promoting public goods. Third, we replace our measure
of land inequality with our measure of political power and repeat the
bivariate OLS regression. We find that the R2 increases by the factor of
7.7 due to this replacement (for further details, see Columns 1 and 2 of
Table D.14). Finally, we calculate coefficients of partial determination for
27Acemoglu et al. (2008) provide evidence from Columbia, suggesting that a high level of
land inequality does not necessarily imply that the landowning elite has great political
power.
28More specifically, we use the available data to calculate the share of agricultural land
that belongs to a large landholding. Following Cinnirella and Hornung (2016, 2017), we
define a landholding as “large” if its area exceeds 100 ha.
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both measures and observe that the partial R2 of our measure of political
power is 0.232, while it is only 0.019 for our measure of land inequality.
We also check whether our main findings change in a notable manner
when adding our measure of land inequality to our basic regression models.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table D.14 show the results of this test. We observe
that the relationship between the local political power of the landless elite
and the provision of health-promoting public goods remains positive and
statistically significant.
4.4.6 Total public spending
In Section 4.3, we shed light on two reasons for why the landless elites
provide more health-promoting public goods than the landowning elites. On
the one hand, we show that landless elites face a higher risk of strikes
whereas, on the other hand, landowning elites benefit more from health
infrastructure investments. Another potential explanation is that public
spending in general increases if power shifts from landowning to landless
elites. To test whether this is indeed the case, we digitize balance sheets
published by Tetzlaff (1911, 1914). These balance sheets include the total
expenditure of all Prussian counties in 1908 and all Prussian towns and
rural communities in 1911.29 We aggregate this data to the county level
and use both the total expenditures and the total expenditures per capita
as dependent variable in our cross-sectional analyses. Table D.15 shows the
results. The OLS estimates indicate a positive and statistically significant
relationship between the power of the landless elite and total government
spending. The 2SLS results suggest that this finding does not hold when
addressing endogeneity issues. We therefore believe that differences in total
government spending cannot explain why the landless elite provides more
health-promoting public goods than the landowning elite. Consistent with
this view, we find that our main results hold when controlling for total
government expenditures (see Table D.16).
4.4.7 Different types of landless elites
A concern regarding our baseline analysis might be that we treat the
landless elite as a homogeneous group and thus neglect that there might
29In our baseline specification, we neglect the time gap and add together all expenditures
without adjustments. We run various robustness checks (not reported, but available
upon request) to rule out that our results are driven by the way of how we deal with
the time gap in our raw data.
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exist substantial differences in how willing the different members of the
landless elite are to support public health infrastructure investments. For
instance, Aidt et al. (2010) suggest that the factory owners had a greater
interest in these investments than the master craftsmen or bureaucrats
in mid-Victorian England. Brown (1989), Krabbe (1985), and Vögele (2001)
provide anecdotal evidence from Prussia and Germany that points in a
similar direction.
To examine whether “capitalist” elites invest more in health-promoting
public goods than other landless elites, we proceed in three steps. In the
first step, we use the biographical information that we compiled for each
politicians in our database to create a dummy that is equal to 1 if the
politician or a close relative of him is a merchant, a banker, or a factory
owner. In the next step, we use the same aggregation procedure as in
Section 3.1 to produce an index that reflects how influential the capitalist
elite was in a particular county. In the final step, we estimate a cross-
sectional regression model that includes our measures for the power of the
landowning and the capitalist elite. Column 1 of Table D.17 presents the
results of our OLS estimation. We find that the political power of the
capitalist elite is positively correlated with the provision of health-promoting
public goods, while the correlation is negative for the power of the land-
owning elite. Consistent with the findings of our mechanism analyses (see
Section 4.3), we also observe that these correlations are more pronounced
for those public goods that prevent the disease outbreaks (see Columns 2
and 3 of Table D.17). Unfortunately, we cannot establish causality at this
stage because a valid instrument for the political power of the capitalist
elite is not available.
4.4.8 Panel data
So far, we have exploited variation across counties to examine whether
changes in the political power of the landless elite affect the provision of
health-promoting public goods. A weak spot of this approach is that we
cannot control for all cultural, geographical, and historical confounders. In
this section, we use the following panel regression model to address this
issue:
Mi,t = ζ + β ·Bi,t−1 + γ ·Xi,t + θt + ξi + εi,t (14)
where i denotes a county, t a five-year period, θ the period fixed effects,
and ξ the county fixed effects. The latter control for all time-invariant
28
factors and make sure that we exploit within-county rather than between-
county variation in the political power of the landless elite. We use the
infant mortality rate (M) as dependent variable since no time-varying data
exists for our baseline measure of public good provision (see also Section
4.4.4).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table D.18 present results from estimating (14).
In Column 1, we apply a regression model in which our measure for the
political power of the landless elite is the only explanatory variable. The
results suggest that the infant mortality rate is lower when the power of
the landless elite is high. Column 2 shows that our estimate of interest
remains negative and statistically significant if we control for county fixed
effects, period fixed effects, and twelve time-varying county characteristics.30
However, compared to Column 1, we observe that the magnitude of our
point estimate drops notably.
The results from our OLS panel regressions might still be biased due
to unobserved time-varying county characteristics and measurement error in
our measure of political power. To mitigate these issues, we also run 2SLS
regressions. Following Galor et al. (2009), we use the interaction between a
measure of soil quality and an index that reflects the nationwide price of
agricultural crops as instrumental variable.31 The econometric logic behind
our instrumentation strategy is that the interaction between an exogenous
variable (share of loamy soils) and an endogenous variable (price index)
is also exogenous (Bun and Harrison, 2019). The economic intuition is that
prices correlate with revenues and, due to political system in Prussia, also
with the distribution of the political power.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table D.18 report the regression results of our
2SLS panel estimations. We find evidence, suggesting that the provision
of health-promoting public goods improves in the political influence of the
landless elite. In particular, Column 4 suggests that the infant mortality
rate decreases by 0.39 standard deviations if the political power of the
landless elite increases by one standard deviation.
We believe for two main reasons that the 2SLS estimates produced in
30Our list of controls includes: the number of Catholics (p.c.), the number of male (p.c.),
the number of young people (p.c.) the number of people who were not born in the
county (p.c.), the number of marriages (p.c.), the number of deaths (p.c.), the number
of births (p.c.), the number of Germans (p.c.), the number military person (p.c.), the
urbanization rate, the population growth, and the number of legitimate births (per
birth). Our data comes from Galloway (2007). For summary statistics, see Table D.19.
31Our index include the prices of four agricultural crops (wheat, rye, barley, flax). The
raw data comes from Jacobs and Richter (1935).
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our panel analyses need to be interpreted with some caution. First of all,
improved public good provision is only one out of many channels through
which the political power of the landless elite might affect infant mortality
rates. Disentangling these channels is not possible because of limited data
availability. Second, we do not have enough control variables to block all
alternative channels through which our instrument might affect the infant
mortality rate. Consequently, our 2SLS estimates might be biased due to a
violation of the exclusion restriction.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether the landless elites in late-19th/early-
20th century Prussia undertook more health infrastructure investments than
the landowning elites. To address this question, we digitize administrative
data on eight health-promoting public goods and hand-collect biographical
information on more than 5,000 locally elected politicians. Our regression
results confirm that public good provision increases in the power of the
landless elite. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we present results from
2SLS regressions that exploit natural variation in soil texture. We find
evidence for two mechanisms. The first is that the landless elite faced a
higher risk of strikes than the landowning elite since workers’ movements
were worse organized in the agricultural sector than in the other sectors.
The second mechanism is that the landless elites had greater economic
benefits from providing health-promoting public goods because infectious
diseases were more likely to spread among industrial worker than among
agricultural workers due to narrower workspaces. We also show that the
relevance of these mechanisms varies for those public goods that improve
the access to medical treatment and those that prevent disease outbreaks.
A potential concern about our study might be that our findings suffer
from low external validity. We believe that this is not the case since the
social and political situation in Prussia was similar as in other countries
that industrialized in the 19th century. In particular, in most of these
countries, we observe that the health infrastructure improved significantly
during the late-19th/early-20th century and that the political power was
distributed between an “old” landowning elite and an “emerging” landless
elite. Furthermore, as pointed out by Szreter (1999) and Konteh (2009)
notable similarities exist between the health developments of 19th-century
Europe and today’s developing countries. We are thus convinced that our
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results do not only improve the knowledge about past differences in the
provision of health-promoting public goods, but also help to understand
present-day differences between and within developing countries. Implicitly,
our findings also suggest that development policies that increase the power
of workers’ movements or inform local elites about the economic benefits
that they have when supporting the provision of health-promoting public
goods can improve the health of the poor.
From a conceptual point of view, our paper illustrates that a careful
distinction between the different types of human-capital promoting public
goods is important to identify the political economy mechanisms at work.
Two aspects are noteworthy in this regard. First, the reasons for why
the landless and the landowning elite differ in their policy preferences are
different for education and health. In particular, related studies find that
landowners actively block the expansion of public schooling (see Cvrcek
and Zajicek, 2019, Nafziger, 2011). By contrast, our results suggest that the
landowning elites consider the provision of public goods that prevent the
outbreak of infectious diseases just as relatively unimportant. Furthermore,
while the landless elites support public spending on education due to its
productivity enhancing effects (Galor and Moav, 2006), they promote public
spending on health to avoid sick leaves. The second remarkable aspect is
that the motives of the elite differ for different types of health-promoting
public goods. We found that landless elites actively support the provision
of public goods that decrease the risk of infectious diseases. Hospitals and
other healthcare facilities are mainly provided to keep the risk of strikes
low.
The data that we compiled for this project complements existing data
sets on Prussia (see e.g. Becker et al., 2014, Galloway, 2007), and thus opens
prospects for future political economy research. From our perspective, an
interesting question is which socioeconomic factors affected the distribution
of political power in late-19th/early-20th century Prussia. Another pending
issue is whether landless and landowning elites also take different decisions
on other public goods. Finally, we think that a deeper analysis on the
differences within the landless elites is important, especially in order to
understand the large between-city differences in the provision of human-
capital promoting public goods. For Prussia, it is very cumbersome to
run such an analysis because no centralized source exists that provides
information about the composition of city councils.
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Appendix for online publication
A Additional information on the institutional
background
A.1 Administrative structure
The German Empire (Deutsches Kaiserreich) was a federal state that was
founded in 1871 after the Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War. In
total, the German Empire consisted of more than 20 member states. The
vast majority of them were (semi-)constitutional monarchies.1 Compared to
present-day Germany, the territory of the German Empire was 50 percent
larger. The Kingdom of Prussia was, by far, the largest member state
of the German Empire, occupying two-thirds of the German territory and
hosting three-fifths of the German population. Prussia was also politically
dominant since the King of Prussia served as the Emperor of Germany.
The Prussian government applied a hierarchical administrative system to
organize its territory (Hubatsch et al., 1975). At the highest level, Prussia
consisted of 12 – 14 provinces (Provinzen).2 Most of them were headed
by an appointed governor (Oberpräsident) and had an indirectly elected
parliament.3 At the second-highest administrative level, Prussia was sub-
divided into 35 – 36 districts (Regierungsbezirke).4 Apart from their size,
these districts differed from the provinces for two main reasons: first, no
parliaments existed at the district level, and second, the district governor
(Regierungspräsident) had to be a senior civil servant.
At the third-highest level, Prussia’s administrative system distinguished
between counties (Landkreise), which in turn consisted of towns (Städte),
rural communities (Landgemeiden), as well as estates (Güter), and county
1The only exceptions were the Hanseatic cities (Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck) who used a
republican system.
2The number of provinces increased in 1877 and 1881 as the province of Prussia was
divided into two independent parts (East Prussia, West Prussia) and as Berlin was
separated from the province of Brandenburg. For a list that includes all Prussian
provinces, see Table D.1.
3The rules that determined the composition of the provincial parliaments varied across
provinces and changed over time. We will not describe these rules since provincial
parliaments do not play a role in our study. The elected Lord Mayor of Berlin served
as the governor of the eponymous province.
4The total number of districts was 35 in 1871 and increased by 1 in 1905 as the district
of Allenstein (East Prussia) was founded. A list of all districts can be found in Table
D.1.
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boroughs (Stadtkreise).5 The latter were towns that reached a particular
population threshold and decided to become independent.6 Counties were
governed by a county administrator (Landrat). The heads of the county
boroughs were the mayors of the eponymous towns. A local parliament
existed at the county level, as well as in towns and rural communities.
A.2 Political representation at the national, state, and
county level.
Section 2 described how municipal councils were elected in late-19th/early-
20th century Prussia and explained why the electoral laws privileged the
rich in municipal elections. In this section, we complement our description
by providing background information on the voting rules that were used
in federal, state, and county elections. Although the decisions about the
provision of health-promoting public goods were hardly made in county
parliaments, the Prussian House of Representatives, and the lower chamber
of the parliament of the German Empire (Reichstag),7 we will provide a
description of how their members were elected since our measure for the
distribution of the local political power between the landowning and the
landless elite is based on these politicians (see Section 3.1).
A.2.1 Political representation at the national level
The German Empire was a semi-constitutional monarchy with a bicameral
parliament (see Huber, 1988). The upper house (Bundesrat) included 58
deputies who were appointed by the governments of the member states.
The lower house (Reichstag), by contrast, consisted of 397 directly elected
politicians. Each of them represented one constituency.8 The borders of
these constituencies were drawn in 1867/71 and did not change over time.
The suffrage for the Reichstag elections was equal, secret, and restricted to
5Both towns and rural communities varied considerably in their size. For instance, in
1871, the smallest rural communities had less than 100 inhabitants, while the largest
had more than 15.000 inhabitants (Becker and Cinnirella, 2020).
6The actual population threshold varied across Prussian provinces. In most provinces, the
threshold was 25,000 inhabitants. The exceptions were the provinces of Rhineland (40,000
inhabitants) and Westphalia (30,000 inhabitants).
7A notable exception were the university hospitals which were provided by the Prussian
government. Some public hospitals were owned by counties rather than municipalities.
8A candidate required the absolute majority of valid votes to become the representative
of a constituency. If no candidate reached an absolute majority in the first election, a
runoff election took place between the two strongest candidates. The legislative term of
a successful candidate lasted three years until 1888, and five years afterwards.
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males aged 25 or older (Ullmann, 1999).
Compared with other elections in Prussia, Reichtag elections were
considered as relatively fair since the voting weight of a citizen did
not depend on his income (Kühne, 1994a). Nevertheless, the elite, and
especially the landowning elite,9 enjoyed several benefits. For example,
members of the Reichstag did not receive parliamentary allowances until
1906 (see Butzer, 1999). Covering the day-to-day costs and the expenses of
being a parliamentarian was thus hardly possible without assets or employees
that took care of the everyday businesses of the politician.10 Another key
obstacle for movements that represented the interests of the poor was a
series of laws that outlawed all activities and newspapers that aimed to
spread social-democratic principles (see Lidtke, 1966).11
A.2.2 Political representation at the state level
The Prussian parliament consisted of two chambers. The upper chamber
(Herrenhaus) mainly included representatives of the nobility and appointed
intimates of the Prussian King. The members of the lower chamber (Ab-
geordnetenhaus), by contrast, were elected by the male taxpayers aged 24
or older. The electoral system was a variant of the Three-Class Franchise
System (Dreiklassenwahlrecht), As explained in detail in Section 2, a key
feature of this voting rule is that it translated tax payments into voting
power (Becker and Hornung, 2020, Kühne, 1994a).
Elections for the Prussian House of Representatives took place in two
steps. In the first step, each constituency was divided into wards (Urwahl-
bezirke) and each ward elected 3 – 6 electoral delegates (Wahlmänner).12
At the ward level, voters were first ranked according to their taxes, and
then divided into three groups such that the sum of all tax payments did
9The landowning elite benefited especially from the fact that the borders of the
constituencies did not change over time, despite notable migration flows. A consequence
of this persistence was that rural areas, in particular those in the Eastern provinces,
were overrepresented.
10A few political parties set up a compensation fund to partly address this problem (see
Butzer, 1999).
11This series of laws is known as Anti-Socialist laws and was active between 1878 and
1890.
12The total number of electoral constituencies was 256 until 1908, and 276 afterwards.
Constituencies thus often consisted of several counties and county boroughs. Berlin was
the only county borough that was subdivided into several constituencies. Wards had to
have between 750 and 1750 inhabitants and were designed by the county administrator.
Gerrymandering occurred frequently (Kühne, 1994a, Heimann, 2011). Wards elected one
electoral delegate per 250 inhabitants.
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not vary across these three groups.13 On the election day, each of the
groups held, one by one, a non-secret election to select 1 or 2 electoral
delegates. In the second stage of the electoral process, the delegates of a
constituency met to elect 1 – 3 men to represent the constituency in the
House of Representative during the next legislative period.14 A candidate
became elected if more than 50 percent of the present electoral delegates
voted for him (Becker and Hornung, 2020, Heimann, 2011, Kühne, 1994a).15
The Prussian elite benefited from the Three-Class Voting System for
several reasons. A major reason was that the number of voters differed
considerably between the three groups. While the first group often only
consisted of 1, 2, or 3 wealthy voters, the third group usually included
more than 80 percent of the electorate (see Kühne, 1994a).16 Furthermore,
becoming a electoral delegate was quite unattractive for men with low or
intermediate incomes because no compensation was paid for the loss of
working hours.17
A.2.3 Political representation at the county level
Each county in late-19th/early-20th century Prussia had its own indirectly
elected parliament. The members of these parliaments were representatives
of the largest landowners (Großgrundbesitzer), the rural communities, and
the towns. The distribution of seats was determined by two rules: (i) The
share of seats allocated to the towns equaled the urbanization rate, if less
than half of the inhabitants lived in an urban area. Otherwise, this share
was set to 50 percent. (ii) The seats that had not been assigned to the
towns were equally distributed between the large landowners and the rural
communities (Wagner, 2005).
County administrators were not elected by the members of the county
parliaments, but appointed by the Prussian King. The county parliaments
13The thresholds that specify which taxpayer belonged to which group were calculated
at the municipality level until 1893 and at the ward level afterwards. Relevant for
the classification were only the direct taxes (i.e. class-tax, income tax, real estate and
property tax, and business tax).
14A legislative term lasted three years prior to 1888, and five years afterwards. If a
parliamentarian withdrew, a by-election took place.
15If no candidate received a majority in the first round, the election was repeated with
a smaller pool of candidates. If only two candidates were left and obtained the same
number of votes in two subsequent elections, the decision was made by lot.
16Becker and Hornung (2020) suggests that a first-class voter had, on average, 17.5 times
more influence than a third-class voter.
17Kühne (1994a) reports that the men who did not live in the town where the electoral
delegates met lost three working days.
42
could only propose some candidates. This is remarkable because this rule
made it impossible that a person with a social-democratic ideology became
county administrator in Prussia. Another main reason why this influential
position could hardly be filled by a representative of the poor was that
a county administrator had either to be a landowner or an administrative
lawyer that worked before for the Prussian government.
We cannot fully rule out that the Prussian county parliaments included
members of the Social-Democratic Party or another political movement that
represented the interests of the poor since complete lists regarding the
composition of these parliaments are not available. However, we think for
three reasons that their actual number is negligibly small. First, related
studies in history suggest that county parliaments were dominated by the
local elites (see e.g. Nern, 2011, Wagner, 2005). Second, the representatives
of the towns and rural communities were chosen by their parliaments, and
thus by wealthy citizens (for more details, see Section 2).18 Finally, the
available lists of county parliamentarians only include men with a high
social/economic status.19
18The large landowners hold a meeting in which they decided who of them becomes a
member of the county parliament.
19For example, the parliament of the county of Grevenbroich (Westphalia) consisted of
17 landowners, 7 company owners, 1 jurist, and 1 physician in 1912 (Grevenbroicher
Stadtverwaltung, 1912).
43
B Classification of politicians
As explained in Section 3.1, we collected biographical data on a large
number of Prussian politicians and used this data to create a dummy
variable for each incumbent that indicates whether he belonged to the
landed or the landless elite. This supplementary section provides further
details about our coding procedure. In particular, we present a more
extensive description of our coding rules and consider several examples.
B.1 Coding rules
We classify a politician as representative of the landed rather than the
landless elite if and only if at least one of the following four conditions
applies:
(a) One of our sources indicates that the politician owned agricultural
land.
(b) One of our sources indicates that the politician had a relative (e.g.
father, grandfather, brother, uncle, father-in-law) that owned arable
land.
(c) One of our sources indicates that the politician was born, lived, or
died at a manor or an agricultural estate.
(d) One of our sources indicates that a landowner with the same family
name as the politician existed in the county (or a close-by county)
where the politician was born, worked, or died.
A potential objection against our coding rules, and in particular against
conditions (c) and (d), might be that their application creates some
misclassification. We are little concerned about this issue for two main
reasons. First, the number of cases in which our coding decision is only
based on condition (c) or (d) is rather small. Second, the measurement
error that results from this kind of misclassification decreases the chance
that we can find evidence for the hypothesis that public good provision
improves when the political power of the landowning elite decreases.
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B.2 Coding examples
Example 1: Rudolf Hornig
According to Kühne (1994a), Rudolf Hornig was a member of the Abgeord-
netenhaus from 1893 to 1903. He represented the constituency Liegnitz 5,
consisting of the Silesian counties Haynau-Goldberg and Liegnitz. Due to his
mandate, he has a short entry in the biographical handbook published by
Bernhard Mann (see Figure B.2). Mann (1988) reports that Rudolf Hornig
was born in 1855 and died in 1904. His place of birth was a manor (März-
dorf ) in the county of Haynau-Goldberg. Mann’s handbook also indicates
that Rudolf Hornig was a Protestant and owned a manor (‘Gutsbesitzer ’).
Because of the these information, we classified him as a representative of
the landowning elite.
Example 2: Karl Leopold von Reichenbach
Hubatsch et al. (1975) report that Karl Leopold von Reichenbach served as
county administrator of Bunzlau (Silesia) between 1848 and 1874. The 3rd
edition of the book Gothaisches Genealogisches Taschenbuch der briefadligen
Häuser (published in 1909) shows that Karl Leopold von Reichenbach was
born in 1821 as the son of Lorenz Leopold von Reichenbach who owned the
manors ‘Ober Mois ’ and ‘Dippeldorf ’ (see Figure B.3). Due to his family
background, we labeled him as a representative of the landowning elite.
Example 3: Karl Robert-Tornow
Karl Robert-Tornow was county administrator of Labiau (1880 – 1991)
and member of the Abgeordnetenhaus (1888 – 1892). His constituency was
Königsberg 2, which consisted of the East Prussian counties Labiau and
Wehlau. According to Mann (1988), Karl Robert-Tornow was Protestant and
born in 1851 (see Figure B.4). His place of birth was a Pomeranian manor
(Ruhnow). Haunfelder (1994) indicates that this manor was once owned
by Ferdinand Robert-Tornow and that this landowner was a relative of
Karl Robert-Tornow. Consequently, we classified Karl Robert-Tornow as a
representative of the landowning elite.
Example 4: Ernst Birck
Ernst Birck was the county administrator of Bergheim (Rhineland) between
1868 and 1876 (Romeyk, 1994). He was born in Cologne in 1848 and died
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in 1881 in Bonn. His father was a bureaucrat, his father-in-law a land-
owner (see Figure B.1). Because of the latter, we labeled Ernst Birck as
representative of the landowning elite.
Example 5: Emil Kautz
Emil Kautz served as the county administrator of Johannisburg (East
Prussia) from 1901 to 1904 (Stüttgen, 1980). His Wikipedia page suggests
that he was born in a town, called Hohenstein, in the county of Osterode
(East Prussia) in 1866. Unfortunately, no further information exist about
Emil Kautz. However, Ellerholz and Lodemann (1879) indicate that Franz
Kautz and Wilhelm Kautz owned land in Osterode in 1879. We presume
that Emil Kautz is a relative of these landowners and thus labeled him as
a representative of the landowning elite.
Example 6: Rudolph von Oersten
Rudolph von Oersten was the county administrator of Anklam (Pomerania)
from 1853 to 1889. His Wikipedia page reports that he was born in 1819.
Other personal information are not available. However, we have four other
members of the family “von Oersten” in our database. According to our
references, three of them owned a manor. The fourth had a landowning
father. Rudolph von Oersten is likely to be a relative of these politicians
and we thus classified him as a representative of the landowning elite.
Example 7: Heinrich Macco
Heinrich Macco was a member of the Abgeornetenhaus from 1899 to 1918
(Kühne, 1994b). According to Mann (1988), he was born in the city of
Siegen (Westphalia) in 1843. His father was a lawyer, his grandfather
and his father-in-law worked as merchants (Gerstein, 1987). Heinrich Macco
himself was trained as engineer and was a leading member of an association
that represented the interests of the manufacturers (Mann, 1988). Due to all
these facts, we labeled him as a representative of the landless elite.
Example 8: Franz Engel
Franz Engel was born in 1799 in Leobschütz (Silesia) as the son of a
master tanner. After graduating from school, he became a tanner and took
over the company of his father (Best and Schröder, 1992, Haunfelder, 2004).
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Between 1867 and 1873, Franz Engel was a member of the Reichstag. He
represented the constituency Oppeln 9 (Leobschütz ). Franz Engel died in his
home town in 1877. Because of his family background and his occupational
activity, we classified him as a representative of the landless elite.
Example 9: Friedrich von Wolffgramm
Friedrich von Wolffgramm received his noble title in 1890 and served as
the county administrator of Stallupönen (1872 – 1874) and Gerdauen (1874
– 1884). He was born in Königsberg (East Prussia) in 1836 as the son
of a soldier (Janecki, 1893). His mother and his father were both born
in Magdeburg (Saxony), one of the largest Prussian cities at this time.
Since Janecki (1893) provides no information suggesting that Friedrich von
Wolffgramm owned a manor or had landed relatives, we classify him as a
representative of the landless elite. To double check our classification, we
use the list published by Ellerholz and Lodemann (1879). In this list, we
found no landowner named “Wolffgramm” in the province of East Prussia.
B.3 Illustrative material.
Figure B.1 Biographical information about Ernst Birck
Sources: Horst Romyek (1994): Die leitenden staatlichen und kommunalen
Verwaltungsbeamten der Rheinprovinz 1816 – 1945.
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Figure B.2 Biographical information about Rudolf Hornig
Source: Bernhard Mann (1988): Biographisches Handbuch für das preussische Abge-
ordnetenhaus: 1867 – 1918.
Figure B.3 Biographical information about Karl Leopold von Reichenbach
Source: Gothaisches genealogisches Taschenbuch der briefadeligen Häuser (1909).
Figure B.4 Biographical information about Karl Robert-Turnow
Source: Bernhard Mann (1988): Biographisches Handbuch für das preussische Abge-
ordnetenhaus: 1867 – 1918.
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C Additional figures





































































































































































Notes: This figure presents the results of a jackknife analysis in which we separately add 16
country characteristics to the regression model used in Column 3 of Table 3. The black dots
indicate the OLS estimates for our main variable of interest. The black vertical lines show the
90 percent confidence intervals. The red horizontal line reflects our baseline OLS estimate (see
Column 3 of Table 3).





























































































































































Notes: This figure presents the results of a jackknife analysis in which we separately add 16
country characteristics to the regression model used in Column 4 of Table 3. The black dots
indicate the 2SLS estimates for our main variable of interest. The black vertical lines show the
90 percent confidence intervals. The red horizontal line reflects our baseline 2SLS estimate (see
Column 4 of Table 3).
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Notes: This figure presents the results of a jackknife analysis in which we consecutively exclude
each district from our sample. The black dots indicate the OLS estimates for our main variable
of interest. The black vertical lines show the 90 percent confidence intervals. The red horizontal
line reflects our baseline OLS estimate (see Column 3 of Table 3).






























































































































Notes: This figure presents the results of a jackknife analysis in which we consecutively exclude
each district from our sample. The black dots indicate the 2SLS estimates for our main variable
of interest. The black vertical lines show the 90 percent confidence intervals. The red horizontal
line reflects our baseline 2SLS estimate (see Column 4 of Table 3).
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Notes: This figure presents the results of a jackknife analysis in which we consecutively exclude
each province from our sample. The black dots indicate the OLS estimates for our main variable
of interest. The black vertical lines show the 90 percent confidence intervals. The red horizontal
line reflects our baseline OLS estimate (see Column 3 of Table 3).






































































Notes: This figure presents the results of a jackknife analysis in which we consecutively exclude
each province from our sample. The black dots indicate the 2SLS estimates for our main variable
of interest. The black vertical lines show the 90 percent confidence intervals. The red horizontal
line reflects our baseline 2SLS estimate (see Column 4 of Table 3).
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Notes: This figure presents the results of a jackknife analysis in which we consecutively exclude
one of our eight health-promoting public goods. The black dots indicate the OLS estimates for
our main variable of interest. The black vertical lines show the 90 percent confidence intervals.
The red horizontal line reflects our baseline OLS estimate (see Column 3 of Table 3).








































































Notes: This figure presents the results of a jackknife analysis in which we consecutively exclude
one of our eight health-promoting public goods. The black dots indicate the 2SLS estimates for
our main variable of interest. The black vertical lines show the 90 percent confidence intervals.
The red horizontal line reflects our baseline 2SLS estimate (see Column 4 of Table 3).
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D Additional tables
Table D.1 List of Prussian provinces and districts.
Provinces Districts
East Prussia Königsberg, Gumbinnen, Allenstein
West Prussia Danzig, Marienwerder
Berlin Berlin
Brandenburg Potsdam, Frankfurt
Pomerania Stettin, Köslin, Stralsund
Poznan Posen, Bromberg
Silesia Breslau, Liegnitz, Oppeln
Saxony Magdeburg, Merseburg, Erfurt
Schleswig-Holstein Schleswig Holstein
Hanover Hanover, Hildesheim, Lüneburg, Stade, Osnabrück, Aurich
Westphalia Münster, Minden, Arnsberg
Hesse-Nassau Kassel, Wiesbaden
Rhineland Koblenz, Düsseldorf, Köln, Trier, Aachen
Hohenzollern Sigmaringen
Notes: The province of East Prussia and West Prussia formed together the province of Prussia until
1877. The province of Berlin belonged to the province of Brandenburg until 1881. The district of
Allenstein was founded in 1905.
Table D.2 Overlaps between different political posts.




County director & MP Abgeordnetenhaus 256
County director & MP Reichstag 69
MP Abgeordnetenhaus & MP Reichstag 601
County director & MP Abgeordnetenhaus & MP Reichstag 77
Notes: Several politicians in our database held more than one political post between 1867 and 1914. In
this table, we provides detailed information about the overlap.
Table D.3 Calculation examples: Provision of health-promoting public goods (Waldenburg
& Reichenbach, Silesia, 1911)
Public Good Waldenburg (107 Muni.) Reichenbach (90 Muni.)
Hospitals 7 [0.065] 1 [0.011]
Nursing facilities 36 [0.336] 5 [0.056]
Public health fund 2 [0.019] 1 [0.011]
Sewage systems 7 [0.065] 2 [0.022]
Water supply systems 17 [0.159] 1 [0.011]
Waste collection 1 [0.009] 1 [0.011]
Public baths 1 [0.009] 1 [0.011]
Slaughter houses 2 [0.019] 2 [0.022]
Total coverage rate (H) 0.0886 0.0194
Notes: This table presents two examples to illustrate how we measure the provision of health-promoting
public goods. In brackets, we report the share of municipalities that provided a particular public good























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table D.5 Summary statistics (cross-sectional analysis).
Variable Year/Period Mean Std. Dev. Data Source
Panel A: Measures for the political power of the landless elite
Additive approach 1871 – 1911 0.3472 0.2475 See Section 3.1.
Multiplicative approach 1871 – 1911 0.4018 0.3008 See Section 3.1.
County director 1871 – 1911 0.2504 0.2835 See Section 3.1.
MP Abgeordnetenhaus 1871 – 1911 0.3909 0.2948 See Section 3.1.
MP Reichstag 1871 – 1911 0.4003 0.3330 See Section 3.1.
Additive approach 1900 – 1911 0.3779 0.2977 See Section 3.1.
Additive approach that excludes the
politicians without data
1871 – 1911 0.3507 0.2479 See Section 3.1.
Panel B: Measures for the provision of health-promoting public goods
Coverage rate (all) 1911 0.1049 0.1927 See Section 3.2
Coverage rate (access) 1911 0.1304 0.1919 See Section 3.2
Coverage rate (prevention) 1911 0.0879 0.2032 See Section 3.2
Coverage rate (urban) 1911 0.4476 0.2299 See Section 3.2
Coverage rate (rural) 1911 0.0463 0.0425 See Section 3.2
Panel C: Instrumental variable
Share of loamy soils Time-invariant 0.2979 0.2297 Meitzen (1869, 1894).
Panel D: Basic controls
Deaths (per capita) 1871 0.0293 0.0053 Galloway (2007)
Stillbirths (per birth) 1871 0.0409 0.0134 Galloway (2007)
People in health sector (p.c.) 1871 0.0013 0.0007 Galloway (2007)
Beds in public hospital (p.c.) 1875 0.0010 0.0013 Engel (1877)
Beds in maternity hospitals (p.c.) 1875 0.00002 0.00015 Engel (1877)
Panel E: Demographic controls
Catholics (p.c.) 1871 0.3517 0.3821 Galloway (2007)
Male (p.c.) 1871 0.4908 0.0233 Galloway (2007)
Young people (p.c.) 1871 0.4532 0.0357 Galloway (2007)
Married people (p.c.) 1871 0.3361 0.0239 Galloway (2007)
Workers (p.c.) 1871 0.3671 0.0499 Galloway (2007)
People born in other county (p.c.) 1871 0.2068 0.1005 Galloway (2007)
Illiterate (p.c.) 1871 0.0938 0.0871 Becker et al. (2014)
Germans (p.c.) 1875 0.9960 0.0125 Galloway (2007)
Military persons (p.c.) 1875 0.0082 0.0159 Galloway (2007)
Polish community (dummy) Time-invariant 0.1243 0.3304 Galloway (2007)
Danish community (dummy) Time-invariant 0.0106 0.1025 Galloway (2007)
Lithuanian community (dummy) Time-invariant 0.0079 0.0889 Galloway (2007)
Legitimate births (per birth) 1871 0.9208 0.0443 Galloway (2007)
Population (log) 1871 10.8449 0.4411 Galloway (2007)
Population density (log) 1871 -0.1810 1.0007 Galloway (2007)
Urbanization rate 1875 0.2826 0.2099 Galloway (2007)
Panel F: Administrative controls
Number of towns 1910 2.9656 2.0617 Galloway (2007)
Number of rural communities 1910 81.8466 56.1658 Galloway (2007)
Number of estates 1910 39.7831 43.1363 Galloway (2007)
Panel G: Economic controls
Employees in agriculture (p.c.) 1871 0.1833 0.0686 Galloway (2007)
Employees in mining (p.c.) 1871 0.0061 0.0175 Galloway (2007)
Employees in transport (p.c.) 1871 0.0107 0.0062 Galloway (2007)
Employees in education (p.c.) 1871 0.0029 0.0011 Galloway (2007)
Employees in service (p.c.) 1871 0.0399 0.0242 Galloway (2007)
Panel H: Other variables
Share of land owned by large
landowners
1882 0.2843 0.2244 Becker et al. (2014)
Relative change in infant mortality 1875 – 1913 0.1991 0.1449 Galloway (2007)
Initial level of infant mortality (log) 1875 – 1879 -1.4879 0.1964 Galloway (2007)
Strong Workers’ Movements (dummy) 1871 – 1911 0.2487 0.4328 Galloway (2007)
Ratio between employed and
self-employed people
1882 8.205 30.9522 Becker et al. (2014)
Total public spending (log) 1911 14.8834 1.0296 Tetzlaff (1911, 1914)
Per-capita public spending (log) 1911 3.7599 0.5264 Tetzlaff (1911, 1914)
Power capitalist elite 1871 – 1911 0.1655 0.1668 See Section 3.1.
Power landowning elite 1871 – 1911 0.6528 0.2475 See Section 3.1.
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for all variables that we use in our cross-sectional analyses.
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Table D.6 Cross-sectional results (first-stage and reduced-from estimates).
First-stage estimates Reduced-form estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of loamy soils -0.251*** -0.128*** -0.136***
(0.0454) (0.0433) (0.0427)
Power landless elite -0.063*** -0.041** -0.046***
(0.0156) (0.0167) (0.0157)
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Basic Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: This table present the first-stage and reduced-form estimates for our main 2SLS regressions (see
Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3). All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We present robust standard
errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that are significantly
different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table D.7 Additional control variable (OLS and 2SLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Power landless elite 0.059*** 0.264* 0.068*** 0.283* 0.047** 0.377*
(0.0206) (0.1512) (0.0224) (0.1368) (0.0234) (0.2087)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 4.88 - 6.79 - 4.68
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.084 - 0.034 - 0.031
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes No No No No
Administrative Controls No No Yes Yes No No
Industry Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is a coverage rate that takes into
account eight health-promoting public goods (for details, see Section 3.2). All variables are standardized to
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table
D.5. We present robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point
estimates that are significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Power landless elite 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.088***
(0.0201) (0.0239) (0.0246) (0.0287)
Panel B: 2SLS estimates
Power landless elite 0.345*** 0.338** 0.402** 0.276**
(0.1285) (0.1356) (0.1854) (0.1392)
SW F-Stat. 9.77 8.42 5.08 6.65
SY crit. value (15%/20%) 8.96/6.66 8.96/6.66 8.96/6.66 8.96/6.66
AR p.value 0.002 0.008 0.016 0.037
Observations 361 365 335 297
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is a coverage rate that takes into
account eight health-promoting public goods (for details, see Section 3.2). All variables are standardized to have
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We
present robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that
are significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table D.9 Different types of health-promoting public goods (OLS and 2SLS).
Urban municipalities Rural municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power landless elite 0.156** 0.069 0.141** 0.681*
(0.0672) (0.4243) (0.0646) (0.3496)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 10.08 - 10.08
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.877 - 0.041
Observations 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is a coverage rate that takes into
account eight health-promoting public goods (for details, see Section 3.2). All variables are standardized to have
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We
present robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that
are significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D.10 Alternative measure of political power (OLS and 2SLS). Part I.
County director MP Abgeordnetenhaus MP Reichstag
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Power landless elite 0.062*** 0.398** 0.044** 0.469* 0.045** 0.381**
(0.0209) (0.1921) (0.0211) (0.2479) (0.0181) (0.1722)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 3.85 - 4.15 - 6.70
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.004 - 0.004 - 0.004
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is a coverage rate that takes into
account eight health-promoting public goods (for details, see Section 3.2). All variables are standardized to
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table
D.5. We present robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point
estimates that are significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table D.11 Alternative measure of political power (OLS and 2SLS). Part II.
Multiplicative approach 1900 – 1911
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power landless elite 0.049** 0.324*** 0.068*** 0.316***
(0.0201) (0.1242) (0.0170) (0.1122)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 10.41 - 9.59
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.004 - 0.004
Observations 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is a coverage rate that takes into
account eight health-promoting public goods (for details, see Section 3.2). All variables are standardized to
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table
D.5. We present robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point
estimates that are significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D.12 Alternative measure of political power (OLS and 2SLS). Part III.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Power landless elite 0.158*** 0.263*** 0.091*** 0.347** 0.079*** 0.362***
(0.0190) (0.0595) (0.0241) (0.1583) (0.0231) (0.1399)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 26.30 - 7.03 - 8.17
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.000 - 0.014 - 0.004
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is a coverage rate that takes into
account eight health-promoting public goods (for details, see Section 3.2). All variables are standardized to
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table
D.5. We present robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point
estimates that are significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table D.13 Changes in infant mortality rates (OLS and 2SLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Power landless elite 0.470*** 0.401* 0.154*** 0.516* 0.180*** 0.548**
(0.0496) (0.2207) (0.0524) (0.2990) (0.0521) (0.2772)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 24.76 - 9.12 - 10.00
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.095 - 0.074 - 0.048
Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378
Initial Infant Mortality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is the relative change in the
infant mortality rate between the late 19th century (1875 – 1879) and the beginning of the early 20th
century (1909 – 1913). All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of
1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We present robust standard errors in
parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that are significantly different from
zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D.14 Land inequality (OLS and 2SLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power landless elite 0.499*** 0.062*** 0.327**
(0.0776) (0.0223) (0.1471)
Land inequality -0.178*** -0.094*** -0.016
(0.0534) (0.0292) (0.0558)
Approach OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
R2 0.03 0.24 0.96 0.93
SW F-Stat. - - - 7.51
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - - - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - - - 0.014
Observations 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy No No Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Basic Controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates. All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We present robust standard errors
in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that are significantly different from
zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table D.15 Public spending (OLS and 2SLS).
Total public spending (log) Public spending p.c. (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power landless elite 0.306*** 0.398 0.158*** 0.206
(0.0539) (0.3015) (0.0519) (0.3216)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 10.08 - 10.08
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.191 - 0.531
Observations 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We present
robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that are
significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D.16 Control for public spending (OLS and 2SLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power landless elite 0.058** 0.339** 0.073*** 0.335***
(0.0234) (0.1394) (0.0245) (0.1264)
Total pub. spend. (log) 0.078*** -0.007
(0.0205) (0.0482)
Pub. spend. p.c. (log) 0.053*** 0.005
(0.0181) (0.0312)
Approach OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - 7.68 - 8.80
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - 8.96/6.66 - 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - 0.011 - 0.005
Observations 378 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We present
robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that are
significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table D.17 Different types of landless elites (OLS).
All public goods Access Prevention
(1) (2) (3)
Power capitalist elite 0.058** 0.065* 0.052**
(0.0245) (0.0378) (0.0209)
Power landowning elite -0.054** -0.037 -0.062***
(0.0226) (0.0315) (0.0216)
Approach OLS OLS OLS
Observations 378 378 378
County-Borough-Dummy Yes Yes Yes
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS estimates. All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1. For summary statistics and a list of controls, see Table D.5. We present robust standard errors
in parentheses and apply the following notation to highlight point estimates that are significantly different from
zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table D.18 Panel regressions (OLS and 2SLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Power landless elite -0.237*** -0.026** -0.443** -0.389*
(0.0379) (0.0119) (0.1913) (0.2222)
Approach OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
SW F-Stat. - - 35.58 7.26
SY crit. value (15%/20%) - - 8.96/6.66 8.96/6.66
AR p.value - - 0.024 0.014
Observations 2,695 2,695 2,646 2,646
County Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Period Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Control Variables No Yes No Yes
Notes: This table shows OLS and 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is the 1-year infant mortality rate.
All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For summary statistics and
a list of controls, see Table D.19. We present robust standard errors in parentheses and apply the following
notation to highlight point estimates that are significantly different from zero: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table D.19 Summary statistics (panel analysis).
Variable Year/Period Mean Std. Dev. Data Source
Panel A: Distribution of political power
Power landless elite 1875 – 1910 0.3441 0.2965 See Section 3.1
Panel B: Public good provision
1-year infant mortality rate 1875 – 1910 0.2244 0.0505 Galloway (2007)
Panel C: Instrumental variables
Soil × Price Index 1875 – 1910 27.7540 21.5641 Jacobs and Richter
(1935), Meitzen (1869,
1894)
Panel D: Control variables
Catholics (p.c.) 1875 – 1910 0.3579 0.3756 Galloway (2007)
Male (p.c.) 1875 – 1910 0.4894 0.0149 Galloway (2007)
Young people (p.c.) 1875 – 1910 0.4591 0.0316 Galloway (2007)
Marriages (p.c.) 1875 – 1910 0.0391 0.0046 Galloway (2007)
People born in other county (p.c.) 1875 – 1910 0.2471 0.1139 Galloway (2007)
Births (p.c.) 1875 – 1910 0.1906 0.0272 Galloway (2007)
Germans (p.c.) 1875 – 1910 0.9939 0.0159 Galloway (2007)
Military persons (p.c.) 1875 – 1910 0.0082 0.0155 Galloway (2007)
Share of legitimate births 1875 – 1910 0.9235 0.0408 Galloway (2007)
Population growth 1875 – 1910 0.0339 0.0600 Galloway (2007)
Urbanization rate 1875 – 1910 0.3025 0.2141 Galloway (2007)
Deaths (p.c.) 1875 – 1910 0.0786 0.0121 Galloway (2007)
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for all variables that we use in our panel analyses.
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